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The powerful machine of our criminal justice system feeds off of the
accused's own incriminating statements. An overwhelming percentage of
criminal cases are resolved by the defendant's admission of guilt at a plea
colloquy.2 In the rare criminal case that proceeds to trial, the government's
evidence regularly includes a presentation of the defendant's pre-trial
statement, his "confession." By guilty plea or at trial, one way or another,

2 Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 16 (Nov. 20, 2014)
https://www.nybooks.com/articles.2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty (explaining that
over 90 percent of all criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas and that the number is significantly
higher in the federal system).

In 2013, while 8 percent of all federal criminal charges were dismissed (either because
of a mistake in fact or law or because the defendant had decided to cooperate), more than
97 percent of the remainder were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3
percent went to trial. The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed.
Id. "Over the last 50 years, defendants chose trial in less than three percent of state and federal
criminal cases-compared to 30 years ago when 20 percent of those arrested chose trial. The
remaining 97 percent of cases were resolved through plea deals." INNOCENCE PROJECT, Report:
Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on the Decline, Innocence Staff Aug. 7, 2018,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline/.
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e) (2006) (effective Jan 3, 2012). Confession is defined as "any
confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally
or in writing." Id.; United States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 1993); see also MANUAL
OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 4.1.
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the government most certainly will use the accused's own words against
him.4
The accused, by contrast, may struggle to tell his' side of the story
at trial. Forgoing any meaningful constitutional analysis, trial courts rely
instead on an inflexible application of the rules of evidence. 6 The criminal
defendants have lodged primarily evidentiary arguments to make use of the
favorable, non-incriminating portions of their pre-trial statements.' Trial
courts categorically exclude the criminal defendant from independently
admitting any part of his pretrial statement at trial.' Most trial courts
similarly prohibit the defendant from contemporaneously presenting the
non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement that have been omitted
from the government's presentation.' Lastly, trial courts will forbid the
defendant from even referring to the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial
statement in questioning government witnesses during cross-examination.o

"You have heard testimony that the defendant made a statement. It is for you to decide (1) whether
the defendant made the statement, and (2) if so, how much weight to give to it." Id. The
commentary to § 4.1 of the Ninth Circuit's criminal instructions states, "[t]his instruction uses the
word 'statement' in preference to the more pejorative term, 'confession'. . . [which] implies an
ultimate conclusion about the significance of a defendant's statement, which should be left for the
jury to determine." Id. (citingHoac, 990 F.2d at 1108 n.4).
4 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1) ("[T]he defendant may be placed under oath, and the court
must address the defendant personally in open court."); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)
(defining "not hearsay" as a statement made by a party, like the criminal defendant, and offered by
the party opponent).
Throughout this Article, male possessive pronouns ("his" and "him") are used to reference
the accused.
6 See infra Section III (discussing the constitutional rights at issue when presenting the theory
of the defense, fundamental fairness and enumerated, rights under the Sixth Amendment); see also
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A); infra Section II (describing how trial courts address the matter of
defendant's non-inculpatory pretrial statements under evidentiary rules alone) and Section V
(highlighting some evidentiary arguments denied by trial courts).
7 See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that
his pretrial statement was "statement against interest" and exception to inadmissible hearsay under
Rule 804(b)(3)).
8 See infra Section II (discussing how trial courts treat defendant's pretrial statement under
purely evidentiary considerations); see also FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(A). The "not hearsay"
definition turns on who is offering the out-of-court statement. Id. A party opponent may offer the
other party's statement as "not hearsay" but a party may not admit his own out-of-court statements
as it is inadmissible hearsay. Id.
9 See infra Section V (arguing trial courts should allow accused to contemporaneously admit
portions of defendant's pretrial statement that the government omitted in its presentation); see also
FED. R. EvID. 106 (partially codifying common law "rule of completeness" as it relates to "writings
and recordings"); FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (controlling the manner of trial and providing similar
fairness considerations for court as it relates to "oral statements").
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... [and] to be to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . ." Id.; see also infra Section VI (discussing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
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To make some use of the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial
statement, this Article argues that the criminal defendant deserves a more
meaningful constitutional analysis from the lower court." The analysis
draws upon the defendant's constitutional right to advance a "theory of the
defense," 2 the doctrine of fundamental fairness" grounded in the Due
Process Clause,14 and trial-related, constitutional protections enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, particularly under the Sixth Amendment." Common law
evidentiary doctrines 16 and the codified rules of evidence" that govem our
adversarial trial system similarly support a criminal defendant's wider use of
his own pretrial statements at trial. This Article urges trial courts to
reexamine, through the lens of fairness to the criminally accused at trial, the
constitutional protections and evidentiary rules that govern the accused's use
of his own non-inculpatory, pretrial statements at trial.

"confront" the witnesses against him at trial, including his use of his non-inculpatory statements to
formulate questioning of law enforcement witnesses).
I Trial courts may refer to the defendant's privilege against incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment or his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment. See supra Section II.
This Article envisions a more robust constitutional analysis that incorporates: the right to present a
theory of the defense; fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause; the right to a trial before
an impartial jury; and the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him.
12 See infra Section II.a (reviewing the defendant's constitutional right to advance his theory
of the defense to the jury in a criminal trial); see also United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223
(11th Cir. 2016); Paul H. Robinson, CriminalLaw Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 199, 203 (1982).
13 See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial
of it . . . [the Court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial;
the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial."
Id (emphasis added); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (describing whether it "offend[s] those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice").
14 Courts consider the notion of fundamental fairness in criminal trials to be constitutional
because of its connection to the Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV.
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see infra Sections m.b, III.c (discussing Supreme Court's
renewed attention toward defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and to confront witnesses
against him).
16 See FED. R. EvID. 106. "If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement,
an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other writing
or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." Id; see also infra
Section V (discussing common law, evidentiary doctrine of the "rule of completeness" as
incorrectly applied by courts as to defendant's non-inculpatory statements); CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

2005).
" FED. R. EVID. 102, 106, 611(a), 403.

§

5072 (2d ed.
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The introduction in Part I of this Article outlines how the trial courts
currently treat the defendant's use of his pretrial statements. When excluding
the non-inculpatory portions of the defendant's pretrial statement, lower
courts fail to conduct any meaningful constitutional analysis and rely instead
upon a strict application of the rules of evidence. Part II summarizes the
defendant's constitutional right to present his "theory of the defense" at trial.
Lower courts readily agree that the defendant is entitled to present his theory
of the defense, yet too often limit his ability to support his theory with
evidence other than his own testimony under oath at trial.
Part III outlines the constitutional considerations relating to the
accused's ability to present his theory of the defense. This section first
discusses the doctrine of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause
and then discusses the Supreme Court's renewed focus on two trial-related,
constitutional protections under the Sixth Amendment: the defendant's right
to a trial before an impartial jury and his right to confront the witnesses
against him. Last, this section explores the faulty judicial reasoning that
continues to improperly compel the defendant to waive his privilege against
self-incrimination to realize these other constitutional protections afforded
to him at trial.
Part IV contends that the defendant has a constitutional right,
consistent with his theory of the defense, to independently admit some of his
non-inculpatory, pretrial statements at trial.
Part V discusses how
fundamental fairness and common-law evidentiary doctrine support the
contemporaneous admission into evidence of the defendant's noninculpatory, pretrial statements when the government presents his confession
at trial. Part VI argues that the defendant's constitutional right to a
meaningful cross-examination of government witnesses, particularly law
enforcement witnesses, similarly embraces a permissible use for his pretrial
statements. Trial courts must allow the accused, during cross-examination,
to refer to portions of his pretrial statement that, consistent with his theory
of the defense, challenge the nature and quality of the investigation.
Lastly, Part VII sets out proposed discrete limitations on the
defendant's use at trial of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements and a
proposed balancing test to apply in ruling on the admissibility of such
statements so as not to subvert the fundamental underpinnings of the criminal
justice system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The American criminal justice system requires a sea-change in
criminal procedure and policy related to trial courts' admissibility
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determinations governing the criminal defendant's pretrial statements. Trial
courts effectively gloss over any meaningful constitutional analysis and
proceed to a one-sided, government-oriented application of the rules of
evidence." More is required from a criminal justice system which is
designed to ensure constitutional protections for the accused at trial and
preserve an adversarial jury system that is premised on fairness to all
parties.19
a. How it currently works?
The accused, prior to trial, may move to suppress his incriminating
pretrial statement on constitutional grounds under the voluntariness
standard2 0 of the Fifth Amendment and the proscriptions of Miranda v.
Arizona.2 1 Once the defendant's suppression motions are denied,22 however,
the trial court almost exclusively relies upon the rules of evidence to
1" See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), advisory committee notes to proposed rules. "Admissions by
a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility
in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the
hearsay rule." Id. (citing John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 484, 564 (1937)); see also EDMUND MORRIS MORGAN, JOINT

COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 265 (1962); JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON

LAW § 1048 (2d ed. 1925). "No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission.
The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance
of trustworthiness ... and the rule requiring firsthand knowledge ... calls for generous treatment
of this avenue to admissibility." Id.
19 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). A jury trial is central to the American
criminal trial system. Id.
20 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming voluntariness as the Fifth
Amendment standard for the defendant to challenge a confession compelled by government
coercion); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The MirandaCourt concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial
interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the
risk that an individual will not be "accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment .. .not to be
compelled to incriminate himself." Id. at 439. Accordingly, the Court laid down "concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. at 442. Those
guidelines established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial
interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four
warnings. Id. at 479 (requiring the following warnings prior to any questioning: (1) of his right to
remain silent; (2) that anything he says could be used against him in a court of law; (3) that he has
a right to the presence of an attorney; and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed to him before any questioning).
22 The defendant's motions to suppress raise constitutional challenges to the government's
conduct during the investigative stage of the case. These motions are distinguishable from the
constitutional challenges at issue in this Article. This Article argues that the notions of fundamental
fairness during the criminal trial and the accused's trial-related constitutional rights present
alternative considerations for the trial court when making admissibility determinations about the
defendant's pretrial statement. See infra Sections IV, V and VI.
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determine admissibility of the defendant's pretrial statements during the
criminal trial.23 Trial courts, adhering to a strict construction of the rules of
evidence, only allow the government to admit the defendant's pretrial
statement.24 The government, moreover, may redact the defendant's
statement so as to present a version of the accused's confession to the jury
that is most favorable to the government.2 5
By contrast, under current judicial interpretation, the accused can
make almost no use of his own pretrial statements during trial. The
governing rules of evidence do not distinguish the criminal defendant from
any other "party" on trial, including parties to a civil action. 26 The portions
of the defendant's pretrial statement to law enforcement that do not
incriminate him, unless the government otherwise agrees, 27 are categorically
excluded at trial under the rules of evidence. 28 Trial courts also preclude the
jury from contemporaneously considering the non-inculpatory portions of
the defendant's pretrial statement when the government presents the
23 Generally, the admissibility of evidence at trial is governed by the applicable evidence
code,
the parties' motions in limine and the trial court's determinations under Rule 103(d).
24 Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining inadmissible hearsay as an out-of-court statement
offered for the truth of the matter asserted), with 801(d)(2)(A) (defining a statement made by a
party and offered by a party-opponent as "not hearsay"), and FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) advisory
committee's notes to proposed rules (detailing how "admissibility in evidence is the result of the
adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule"). This one-sided
construct of the evidence code did not turn out as scholars predicted in the early days of common
law evidence jurisprudence. See John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsiderationofthe Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 564, 568 (1937) (discussing the "circumstantial utterance theory of
admissions [as] the simplest explanation of their relation to the hearsay rule").
25 See infra Section II.b (offering an illustrative example of the government redacting and
culling of the defendant's pretrial statement); see also infra Section V (arguing that the common
law evidentiary doctrine of "the rule of completeness," partially codified in Rule 106, should allow
the defendant to contemporaneously admit the non-inculpatory portions of his statement with the
government's presentation).
26 See FED. R. EVID. 102, 106, 611(a), 403 (governing the defendant's use of the noninculpatory portions of his pretrial statements). Rules 102, 106, 611(a), and 403 apply equally in
criminal and civil trials. See id; cf FED. R. EVID. 609 (explicitly acknowledging and providing for
the difference between impeachment by prior convictions when the criminal defendant is the
witness at trial as compared to any other witness).
27 The government can agree to contemporaneously admit the defendant's non-inculpatory
statements, as discussed in the second proposal outlined in this Article. See, e.g., PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

§

1.02.

The evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted in
evidence, and stipulations.A stipulation is an agreement between both sides that [certain
facts are true] [that a person would have given certain testimony] .... You may accept
those facts as proved, but you are not required to do so.
Id. (emphasis added).
28 See supra note 24; FED. R. EvID. 801(c), (d)(2)(A) (explaining the difference between
hearsay and nonhearsay).
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incriminating portions in its case-in-chief.29 Lastly, lower courts even limit
the defense's viable avenues of cross-examination and questions that may be
asked during cross-examination of government witnesses if the line of
30
inquiry touches upon his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements.
The drafters of the rules of evidence intended this outcome for the
criminally accused,3 1 but, as argued in this Article, the Framers of
Constitution did not.32
The criminal defendant deserves a more meaningful constitutional
analysis regarding the admission of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements
33
so that he may properly support and argue his theory of the defense at trial.
As it stands now, if his trial were a motion picture, the portions of the

29 See infra Section V (discussing how the accused's constitutional rights and common law
evidentiary doctrine should command a different admissibility outcome when the government
presents select portions of the defendant's pretrial statement as his confession at trial); see also
infra note 148.
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). See also United
States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant could not question a
law enforcement witness on cross-examination using his own pretrial, exculpatory statements);
United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that whether limitations
on cross-examination are so severe as to violate the Confrontation Clause is a question of law
reviewed de novo). In Ortega, the accused actually raised the precise confrontation clause
challenge that is argue for in the third proposal of this Article. 203 F.3d at 679-81. The trial court
held that the defendant was not permitted to use his exculpatory statements because he waived his
privilege against self-incrimination by testifying at trial. Id. at 682-83. Of course, procedurally, the
defendant made his decision to testify after the court foreclosed his cross-examination using his
non-inculpatory statements during his case-in-chief. Id.
31 The admission of statements by party opponents, under Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(A), operates
less as an evidentiary rule and more like the doctrine of estoppel. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
The reception of admissions, therefore, need not be justified on grounds of trustworthiness; the
significance of an admission is "interpartes, like estoppel or resjudicata,which some- times make
truth irrelevant." Roger C. Park, The Rationale ofPersonalAdmissions,21 IND. L. REV. 509, 510
(1988). "[A] party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that
he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath." Id (citing EDMUND
MORRIS MORGAN, JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvIDENCE

266 (1962)). The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes known as the doctrine of preclusion of
inconsistent statements, prevents a party from asserting a position contrary to an earlier successful
position in another proceeding. See 1 John Moore, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.3[9], at 10607 (1994). In other words, under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, where a party assumes a certain
position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not take a contrary
position in a subsequent case simply because his interests have changed. Id; see also Patriot
Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 211-15 (1st Cir. 1987).
32 See infra Sections IV, V (arguing that the accused should be able to admit or otherwise make
use of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements under the doctrine of fundamental fairness grounded
in the Due Process Clause and the Supreme Court's renewed focus on trial-related constitutional
rights under the Sixth Amendment).
33 See infra Section II (outlining the criminal defendant's constitutional right to advance a
"theory of the defense" at trial, so long as supported by evidence).
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accused's pretrial statements potentially favorable to him which align with
his theory of the defense end up on the cutting room floor. But why?
b. An illustrative example of the Ponzi schemer's confession
For illustrative purposes, consider a fraud case involving a classic
Ponzi scheme. The scheme to defraud involved multiple participants with
varying levels of involvement and the requisite criminal intent.3 4 For
purposes of demonstrating the constitutional violations and fundamental
unfairness to the accused described in this Article, consider the following
voluntary, pretrial statement made to law enforcement officials by a
promoter of the fraud scheme:
1. I didn't do this. These seminars were not my idea. I
didn't have anything to do with the seminars.
2. You should talk to [another suspect]. He was the
mastermind.
3. [The other suspect] did this before with other
communities. He did this in [other jurisdictions]
with otherpeople promoting his scheme.
4. I knew what I was doing was wrong.
5. I knew the [victims] likely didn't understand what
they were getting into.
6. But I never thought [the other suspect] was
committing crimes.
7. I didn't ever imagine that what Michael was asking
me to do was illegal.
*(Law enforcement then informed the defendant about the extent of the fraud
including the number of victims and dollar amount)
8.
9.

I'm so sorry. Ifeel so sorryfor those people.
I didn't even know the extent ofwhat happenedafter
[victims] showed up to the seminars.

3 For example, a scheme to defraud, like a criminal conspiracy, may involve different
participants and varying levels of involvement and culpability: (1) the mastermind; (2) the "pitch
people" who made the false statements to the victims; (3) the "promoters" who recruited or
promoted the scheme by attracting prospective victims; and (4) the "cover-up people" who papered

over the scheme with doctored "account statements" and subsequent communications to the
victims.
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10. I should have known what was going on because
[victims] were so happy, talking about getting rich
and telling theirfriends.

In many ways, the above-described pretrial statement from the
defendant represents a typical "confession" to law enforcement. Some parts
of the statement are incriminating and thus helpful to the government.
However, others are not self-inculpatory; other parts of a defendants' pretrial
statement provide information, investigative leads, and additional suspects
for law enforcement. Information and leads may not only offer law
enforcement investigative steps to pursue during an ongoing investigation
but even if not pursued, they should be admissible if relevant to the
defendant's theory of the case at trial.
At the criminal trial of the promoter that follows, the government
will introduce prosecution-favorable portions of the defendant's pretrial
statement as a "confession." The confession will be presented to the jury as
follows:
*
*
*
*
*

I knew what I was doing was wrong.
I knew the [victims] likely didn't understand what
they were getting into.
I'm so sorry.
I feel so sorryfor the [victims].
I should have known what was going on because the
[victims] were so happy, talking about getting rich
and telling theirfriends.

-

- OR

e ntm idea. I didn 't
I didn 't do this. These s- minars
have anything to do with the seminar-s. You should talk to
[another suspeet]. He- was the mastermind He- did this
beore with other eommunites. H~e did this in [other
jurisdietions] with other p9eople promoting it, like fother
suspets- I knew what I was doing was wrong. I knew the
[victims] likely didn't understand what they were getting
into. But 1 never thought Michael ws eemmitting erime
didn 't ever imagine that what ichael wag asking me o do
wea-Wilegal- I'm so sorry. Ifeel so sorry for the [victims]. I
should have known what was going on because the
[victims] were so happy, talking about getting rich and
telling theirfriends.
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At trial, the defense may object to the government's presentation of
his "confession" on evidentiary grounds, including that it is hearsay and
unfairly prejudicial to the accused. Under current practices, the trial court
will likely overrule these objections and allow the government's presentation
as offered above. Next, the court will not contemporaneously admit the
redacted portions of the accused's pretrial statement under the partiallycodified "rule of completeness" in Rule 106. Lastly, the defendant may seek
to make use of some of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements (paragraphs
#1, 2, 3 and 9 above) to formulate questions during cross-examination of law
enforcement witnesses. But the trial court will likely rule that such use is
impermissible as well.
c. Proposedtrial uses of the accused'spretrialstatement
This Article argues that the defendant enjoys a constitutional right
to advance his theory of the defense to the jury during the criminaltrial. His
theory of the defense can include his intention to sponsor a specific jury
instruction, explore avenues of inquiry during cross-examination of
government witnesses, or argue to the jury in summation. The trial court's
rulings affecting these strategies turn on the defendant's articulation of some
evidence in support of the defense theory. The trial court's admissibility
determinations to exclude the non-inculpatory portions of the defendant's
pretrial statements have constitutional implications under the doctrine of
fundamental fairness and the accused's enumerated constitutional rights
under the Sixth Amendment.
This Article contends that, under some circumstances at trial,3 s the
lower courts must permit the jury to consider the favorable, non-inculpatory
portions of the defendant's pretrial statement that support his theory of the
defense.36 The jury should be allowed to weigh a fuller and more complete
version of his pretrial statement contemporaneously with the government's

3 This Article focuses on three possible uses for the accused's non-inculpatory, pretrial
statements:
i.
ii.
iii.

independent admission in support of the defendants' theory of the defense;
contemporaneous admission with the government's presentation of the
accused's inculpatory statements as his confession at trial; and
use of the portions of the defendant's non-inculpatory, pretrial statements
which criticize the underlying investigation as a means of cross-examining
the government's witnesses.

36 See infra Section IV (describing the constitutional support for the defendant to
independently admit the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement during his defense casein-chief).
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presentation of his "confession" in its case-in-chief.3 7 Lastly, the defendant,
in some instances, should be allowed to refer to the non-inculpatory portions
of his pretrial statement during cross-examination of government witnesses
to support his theory of the defense that is critical of the government's
investigation."
II. DEFENDANT'S "THEORY OF THE DEFENSE" AT TRIAL
A defense is a "set of identifiable conditions or circumstances which
may prevent a conviction for an offense." 39 The criminally accused is
entitled to advance a "theory of the defense" during his criminal trial." The
theory of the defense can materialize in the form of a specially-crafted, jury
instruction presented at trial. 4 ' Similarly, the defense theory can define the
scope of permissible inquiry during cross-examination of government
3
See infra Section V (recounting the constitutional and common law evidentiary arguments
for the defendant to contemporaneously admit the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement
during his government's case-in-chief).
3 See infra Section VI (arguing that the constitution protects the defendant's right to confront
the government's evidence and witnesses, including to make some use of, and explicitly reference,
the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement during his cross-examination of law
enforcement witnesses).
39 See Robinson, supra note 12 (discussing, inter alia, the "failure of proof" defenses available
to the accused at trial).
40 See Stephen Labaton, Lessons of Simpson Case Are Reshaping the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
6, 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting Philip B. Heymann, Professor, Harvard Law Sch.),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/06/us/lessons-of-simpson-case-are-reshaping-the-law.html.

The single most important thing to remember about [the O.J. Simpson] case is that it
involved a trial that is so vastly different from what criminal justice is in the United
States today .. . It reveals an immense disparity in our criminal system, based on how
much wealth a defendant has. In reality, the only reason our system works and does not
grind to a standstill, the only reason most defendants reachplea agreements and do not
fully exploit the benefits of the system, is because they can 't afford it.
Id "The public's perception will be that if you have enough money and celebrity-hood and highpriced lawyers, then you can beat the rap ... This is going to prompt all kinds of tinkering to give
more power to prosecutors." Id. (quoting Roy Black, Lawyer, Florida).
41 Model criminal jury instructions can include versions of the "theory of the defense"
instruction. See, e.g., Kevin F. O'Malley, Jay E. Grenig, & Hon. William C. Lee, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 19.01 (6th ed. 2006); PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CH. 6.01 (SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATrERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS); Eighth
Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction § 8.05; Ninth Circuit Introductory Comments to Chapter 6
(Specific Defenses). While a general instruction is not required, it would read as follows:
(Name) has raised the defense of (state the defense). (State the defense) is a legally
recognized defense to afederal criminal charge. I will instructyou on the law defining
this defense (now) (shortly).
Id.
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witnesses. Trial courts also grant the defense wide latitude when arguing its
theory of the defense in closing.4 2
a. Defendant's theory of the defense is constitutional
The accused's right to instruct the jury on his theory of the defense
is constitutionally protected and inextricably tied to his fundamental right to
a fair trial.43 His right to present his theory of the defense at trial is grounded
in the requirements of due process during the criminal trial." The Supreme
Court has relied on the defendant's general "right to present a defense,"
although a defendant's right to present witnesses must "comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness
and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence."45 The Ninth
Circuit described "[t]he right to have the jury instructed as to the defendant's
theory of the case is . . . 'basic to a fair trial."'4 6 The Fourth Circuit has held

42 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. "At the close of evidence or such earlier time as the trial court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law set
forth in the requests." Id.; see also United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the instruction given by court accurately conveyed the substantive law and the core
of the defense theory, and defendant's counsel was permitted to argue his theory of defense
extensively in closing argument). Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit in Rutgerson relied upon the
extensive defense argument in closing as a basis to not overturn his conviction for failure to give a
"theory of the defense" instruction. See id
43 The defendant has a constitutional right to raise a legally acceptable defense and to present
evidence in support of that defense. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,294-95 (1973); cf United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231,
244 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the defendant, however, is not "entitled to a judicial narrative of
his version of the facts, even though such a narrative is, in one sense of the phrase, a 'theory of the
defense"').
" See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) ("Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of
fundamental fairness. We have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal
defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."). A right to a fair
trial in a federal court is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). A right to a fair trial in a state court is protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S.
786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
45 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1973); see also Martin A. Hewett, Note,
A More Reliable Right to PresentA Defense: The Compulsory Process Clause After Crawfordv.
Washington, 96 Geo. L. Rev. 273, 287-88 (2007) (discussing the Court's decision in Chambers in
terms of the accused's fundamental right to present his theory of the defense).
4 United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196,1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States
v. Sielaff, 615 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1979)).
The general principle is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a
jury instruction on any defense which provides a legal defense to the charge against him
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that "a defendant ... is constitutionally entitled to [a defense] instruction ...
7
if the evidence supports it." 4
Because the defendant's right to present his theory of the defense to
the jury is constitutionally protected as fundamental to a fair trial, the
procedures and policies securing these constitutional guarantees in practice
become vital to the analysis.4 8 Trial courts instead turn the constitutional
analysis on its head. Courts use trial-related constitutional rights more often
as a basis to deny relief to the accused than to grant it.4 9
Lower courts improperly refer to the defendant's option to testify in
his own defense at trial as the best method to advance his theory of the
defense."o This is another layer of unfairness to the accused that also has
At trial, courts essentially pit one
constitutional implications.
other constitutional protections at a
against
right
constitutionally guaranteed
time when the defendant needs those other protections the most. Courts
readily steer the accused into a scenario where he must waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to have an
evidentiary basis for presenting his theory of the defense as is necessary to
have a fair trial and effectively confront the government evidence including
the witnesses testifying against him. The Framers of the Constitution
intended for the accused's different constitutional rights work in tandem for
the accused during his criminal trial, not that the accused be required to
sacrifice some of those rights to secure the others.

and which has some foundation in the evidence, "even though the evidence may be weak,
insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility."
Id
47 Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995) (requiring evidence to properly
support a defense instruction is consistent with other jury instructions that could favor the defendant
at trial such as a "lesser included offense" instruction); see also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605,
611 (1982) (holding "due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only
when the evidence warrants such an instruction").
4 "In plain terms[,] the right to present a defense" is among "the most basic ingredients" of
due process of law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). The Supreme Court has
consistently held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to "a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense" including right to a trial that comports with "fundamental fairness"
derived from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at
485. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
49 See infra Section Ell.c. (addressing the inherent conflict when trial courts refer to the
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a basis to deny other trialrelated constitutional protections).
so See Mark A. Summers, Taking Confrontation Seriously: Does Crawford Mean That
Confessions Must Be Cross-Examined? 76 ALB. L. REv. 1805, 1815 (2013). "[A] criminal
defendant is clearly not unavailable as a witness in any absolute sense. She has the right to testify
on her own behalf." Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987)).
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b. Evidence in support of the defendant's theory
Trial courts recognize that the defendant is entitled to advance his
"theory of the defense" before the jury; yet, courts differ significantly on
how the defendant can support that theory of the defense with evidence. 5 ' A
defendant is purportedly entitled to a jury instruction relating to a defense
theory for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even though the
evidence may be "weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful
credibility."5 2 It follows that whether there is supporting evidence for an
accused's theory of the defense may turn on the court's admissibility
determinations and whether he is allowed to explore certain lines of inquiry
with government witnesses during cross-examination.
Unfortunately, despite the accused's request, the court does not
always give his theory of the defense jury charge. Trial courts deny the
defendant's request for a theory of the defense instruction primarily on two
grounds: first, that the instruction is inadequately supported by the
evidence;s" and, second, that the theory is fairly represented in the applicable
standard jury instructions in a criminal case.54 Of these two grounds to deny
a defense instruction, the former highlights the importance of allowing the
accused to admit or otherwise make use of his non-inculpatory statements in
support of his theory of the defense.

s" See, e.g., United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding trial
court's refusal to give the requested "theory of defense" instructions as "merely statements of the
defense's factual arguments"); United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999) ("A court
errs in refusing a requested instruction only if the omitted instruction is correct, is not substantially
covered by other instructions, and is so important that its omission prejudiced the defendant.");
United States v. Chowdhury, 169 F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Frost,
125 F.3d 346, 372 (6th Cir. 1997)) (rejecting a "theory of the defense" instruction that merely

represented the "defendant's view of the facts of the case, rather than a distinct legal theory").

52 Compare Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d at 1198 (quoting United States v. Sielaff, 615 F.2d

402, 403 (7th Cir. 1979)) (holding that defendants are entitled to the theory of the defense
instruction "even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful
credibility"), with United States v. Wofford, 122 F.3d 787, 788-89 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting United
States v. Morton, 999 F.2d 435, 437 (9th Cir. 1995)) ("A 'mere scintilla' of evidence supporting a
defendant's theory, however, is not sufficient to warrant a defense instruction.").
53 See Kornahrens, 66 F.3d at 1354.
54 See infra Section IId. The second ground for denying a theory of defense instruction reflects
those criminal trials wherein the defendant relies on the theory that the government did not meet
its burden of proof at trial or an affirmative defense with its own standard instructions such as selfdefense or establishing an alibi.

16

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIV

c. Sparse appellate relief on the defendant's theory instruction
The chances for relief for the criminal defendant are bleaker on
appeal. A defendant may challenge the failure of the district court to provide
a jury instruction sought on appeal." A trial court's decision not to include
56
a requested jury instruction can be reversible error. A jury verdict against
the accused may be overturned, however, "only if the instruction that was
sought accurately represented the law in every respect and only if viewing
57
as a whole the charge actually given, the defendant was prejudiced."
The accused can be hard-pressed to demonstrate such prejudice on
appeal once convicted at trial. Where a defendant claims that a trial court
erred for failing to give his requested instruction, appellate courts overturn
the conviction only if: (1) "that instruction is legally correct;" (2) it
''represents a theory of defense with basis in the record that would lead to
acquittal;" and (3) "the theory is not effectively presented elsewhere in the
charge."s
The criminal defendant may rest his hopes upon the government's
high burden of proof during the criminal trial. He has a constitutional right
to remain silent at trial, present no witnesses and evidence in his case and
hold the government to its burden. As is argued elsewhere in this Article,
however, the accused should be allowed to rely upon the panoply of
constitutional rights at trial, the government's high burden of proof, and his
own viable theory of the defense. He should not be compelled to choose one
constitutional protection over another.

* See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 177 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by
183 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1999). Federal appellate courts review de novo whether the district court
correctly construed a hearsay rule. See id. Further, federal appellate courts review exclusion of
evidence under a hearsay rule for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71
F.3d 754, 767 (9th Cir. 1995) (amended by 98 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 1996)).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 504 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the failure
to give a theory of the defense instruction upon request was a reversible error); United States v.
Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 697 (9th Cir. 1973).
5 United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2005).
18 See United States v. Sheehan, 838 F.3d 109, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v.
Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 177 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 540
(2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1992). If, however, the
proposed instruction is not supported by the law, or if the instructions actually given "fairly and
adequately cover ... the issues presented," a theory of the defense instruction need not be given.
See Garcia-Cruz,978 F.2d at 540. The court need not instruct the jury using the defendant's precise
words, as "[a] defendant is not entitled to any particular form of instruction." United States v.
Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 597 (9th Cir. 1992).
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d. Viable theories of the defense
The accused enjoys a constitutional right to advance several viable
theories of the defense before the jury at trial. The nature of the defense
theory dictates whether a specially-crafted jury charge is appropriate and, as
argued here, whether the court's admissibility determinations as to
defendant's pretrial statements have constitutional implications.
i. Defense theories based upon elements, defenses and the burden
of proof
Viable defense theories include claims that (i) the government failed
to prove an element of the offense, (ii) the defendant lacked the requisite
criminal intent of the offense charged, or (iii) a recognized legal or
affirmative defense applies at trial." These theories do not, however,
encompass the constitutional considerations and the prospective relief
discussed in this Article. With these defense theories, the court's standard
jury instructions most likely would adequately cover the defense theory, and
therefore the accused's ability to argue his theory would not be unfairly
restricted nor would admission of his non-inculpatory pretrial statements be
flatly denied as unhelpful to the jury.6 0
ii. Defense theories related to the government's investigation
A criminal trial flows directly from, and is the product of, a
government investigation.6 1 Criminal investigations involve gathering
evidence against the accused and securing statements from percipient
witnesses including the accused. Some of these investigatory steps have
constitutional implications.62
Other investigatory decisions represent
subjective judgements that our society, through the criminal justice system,

s9 See Robinson, supra note 12 at 203 (listing defense theories based on elements, defenses,
and burden of proof).
60 See sources cited supra notes 57-59 (discussing legal authority that allows trial courts to
deny a "theory of the defense" instruction because it is adequately covered in the standard
instructions).
61 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (setting out the connective tissue between the investigation and
trial phases of criminal procedure, as an arrest warrant or summons on a complaint will "establish
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed
it").
62 See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI. The government investigators will seek out witnesses,
conduct searches, gather evidence and possibly attempt to elicit a statement from the defendant as
part of its criminal investigation. See id.
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has entrusted to law enforcement. 63 Law enforcement officers must make
subjective, investigatory decisions about the list of suspects, which leads to
Stated differently, law
pursue, and the scope of the investigation.6
investigation.
of
the
the
"who"
and
"what"
the
enforcement controls
With the world watching, the criminally accused has, at times,
succeeded at trial when attacking the government's investigation as a
defense. 65 As with the defendant's pretrial statements, the government seeks
to control what the jury learns about the underlying investigation. It follows
that the defense's presentation of certain aspects of the investigation do not
assist the jury in its adjudicative duties.6 6 Similarly, modem trial courts have
constrained the criminal defendant's ability to present another perspective
on the investigation consistent with his theory of the defense. Trial courts,
in so doing, have subscribed unwittingly to an axiom: the defendant is on
trial, not the investigation.6 7
However, when the accused's theory of defense challenges the
government's underlying investigation, it carries potential constitutional
implications and, as argued in this Article, affects the trial court's

63

See ANTHONY A. BRAGA, EDWARD A. FLYNN, GEORGE L. KELLING & CHRISTINE M.
COLE, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., MOVING THE WORK OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS TOWARDS
CRIME
CONTROL,
NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
OF
JUSTICE,
1,
23
(Mar.
2011),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/232994.pdf.
Contrary to fictional portrayals, detectives do not work from facts to identification of
suspects; they work from identification of suspects back to facts that are necessary to
prosecute and convict them. The primary job of detectives is not to find unknown
suspects, but to collect evidence required for a successful prosecution of known suspects.
Although fictional detectives are constantly warning against the danger of forming a
hypothesis too early, that is precisely what real detectives do most of the time.
Id at 5.
6 The criminal defendant only knows the duality of the criminal trial. As reflected in the
caption of a criminal case, it is the government versus the accused. To the defendant, law
enforcement functions as his accuser and, therefore, acts with some degree of bias and subjectivity
against him.
6 See Labaton, supra note 40 (discussing the O.J. Simpson case). The ability to openly
critique the investigation during the criminal trial, however, may be a luxury reserved for only the
most notable defendants. The government aims to exclude evidence critical of its underlying
investigation. See United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 679-81 (9th Cir. 2000). Trial courts have
accommodated the government, excluding evidence bearing on the investigation and foreclosing
avenues of defense questioning of law enforcement witnesses. See id.
66 See FED. R. EVID. 403. The court cannot allow the defense to employ graymail tactics by
presenting a recitation of the process by which one enters the system as the criminally accused. See
id. The rules of evidence further protect against the "waste of time" and the "needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Id. However, the jury's time may not be wasted when it learns about
subjective, investigatory choices made in the case and why law enforcement made those choices.
67 See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (holding that the defendant is not
entitled to conduct a wholesale review of the government's investigation).
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admissibility determinations of the non-inculpatory portions of defendant's
pretrial statement that support his theory. These defense theories do not
relate to negating an element or a recognized legal defense.6 8 Yet, the
subjective, strategic decisions by law enforcement during the investigation
are relevant in the criminal trial. For example, evidence of the strategic
decisions within a developing investigation may be relevant because they
impact the credibility of the government's witnesses and the reliability of the
government's other evidence.6 9
For instance, the defendant may request that the court specially craft
a jury instruction based upon his theory that (i) another person committed
the offense (an identity defense), (ii) government investigators failed to
follow up on reasonable, investigative leads that would have led to the
identification of other suspects, or (iii) investigators selectively gathered
only information and evidence consistent with their "tunnel vision" which
prevents them from seeing the suspect as anything other than a defendant.
Evidence supporting these defense theories is relevant70 and can support the
exercise of the defendant's right to cross-examine the government witnesses
who shaped and carried out the investigation.
When foreclosing or limiting defense theories that challenges the
government's investigation at trial, lower courts risk constitutional error by
committing due process violations." Trial courts must carefully weigh
constitutional considerations before denying evidence, or barring
questioning and arguments related to these defense theories about the
government investigation.
Similarly, trial courts must consider the
constitutionality of restricting the defendant's ability to support his variety
68 For example, the defense may believe that the investigation was underdeveloped, sloppy, or
incomplete. The defense may wish to demonstrate in front of the jury that law enforcement
narrowed down to one suspect, the defendant now at trial, too quickly when other investigatory
steps and suspects should have been explored. When the theory of the defense relates to the quality,
integrity and results of the government investigation, then the defendant's constitutional right to
confront those witnesses against him should include the government law enforcement witnesses
who conceived and conducted the investigation.
69 In contrast, many other aspects of the underlying, criminal investigation are wholly
irrelevant during the criminal case. For example, the ministerial, tactical chronology of events that
immediately precede and follow the defendant's arrest do not make any "fact of consequence" more
or less likely than without that evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 401. Execution of searches and pretrial
detainment similarly are irrelevant at the criminal trial under most circumstances. See id. The
criminal trial is not the proper forum to air grievances about accepted aspects of the criminal justice
system and treatment of criminal defendants.
70 See FED. R. EviD. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action."). Decisions that narrow the investigation to a specific suspect do have
"some tendency" to make a "fact of consequence," such as the government's required proof on the
issue of identity, "less likely than without the evidence." Id.
71 See cases cited supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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of defense theories with evidence including the non-inculpatory portions of
the defendant's pretrial statement. The doctrine of fundamental fairness and
certain trial rights under the Sixth Amendment, as discussed below, support
this analysis.
III. FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND TRIAL-RELATED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
reviewed the constitutionality of various aspects the criminal justice system
based upon either an inherent notion of fundamental fairness during the
criminal trial, or upon application of specific, trial-related protections
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.72 The accused's theory of defense,
particularly a theory critical of the government's investigation, relates
directly to both applications. Determinations regarding evidence offered by
the accused related to the government's investigation could entail oftSuch
overlooked constitutional considerations for the trial court.
constitutional considerations include the accused's right to present his theory
of the defense, fundamental fairness grounded in the Due Process Clause,
and enumerated constitutional protections afforded to the accused during the
criminal trial under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
a. Fundamentalfairness and violations of due process
The Constitution requires the government to conduct a fair trial of
the criminal defendant. The Due Process Clause requires that notions of
fundamental fairness govern all phases of the criminal trial.73 The Supreme
Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects against practices and
policies that violate notions of fundamental fairness.7 4 The criminal
defendant may challenge any trial-related practice or policy as violating
fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause. A practice or policy
offends the notions of fundamental fairness when "a fundamental principle

&

72 See generally Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old is New Again: FundamentalFairnessand
the Legitimacy of CriminalJustice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 107 (2005); Craig M. Bradley
Joseph L. Hoffman, People v. Simpson: Perspectiveson the Implicationsfor the CriminalJustice
System: Public Perception, Justice and the "Searchfor Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1267, 1272 (1996).
n See Meares, supranote 72 at 121.
74 See id at 123 ("[T]he Court, in relying on fundamental fairness recognized that the Due
Process Clause is a constitutional guarantee that includes the interests of all of us, not just
defendants.").
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of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and
is the unalienable right of a citizen of such government.""5
Criminal defendants have relied upon the doctrine of fundamental
fairness to challenge government practices and policies at trial.76 The
defense may challenge the fairness of practices and policies designed to
streamline criminal justice and ease the government's path toward
conviction by jury verdict. As the number of criminal trials decline,
however, fundamental fairness due to the accused during his criminal trial
should increasingly outweigh the interests of government efficiency and the
ease of trial convictions.
Even before the steep decline in the number of criminal trials,7 7 the
Supreme Court has relied upon considerations of fundamental fairness in
several instances to ensure the accused's constitutional rights are afforded to
him at trial. For instance, relying on fundamental fairness during the
criminal trial, the Court ensures that the government must prove its case by
meeting the highest burden of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt;78 the burden
of proof should not be shifted to the criminal defendant on any element of
the crime; 79 the government is required to produce reciprocal discovery to

75 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,487 (1978); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,
494 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (overruled by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 68 (1998)) (one of the
"fundamental values" is. . . "our sense of fair play which dictates" a fair balance in the contest
between the state and the individual); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908) (overruled
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964)).
76 See Ian Langford, FairTrial: The History ofan Idea, 8 J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37,
48 (2009)
(quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHIBOLD; ARCHIBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND

PRACTICE (2006) (defining a "fair trial" as when the accused is allowed "a reasonable opportunity
of presenting his case to the court under conditions which do not place him at a substantial
disadvantage vis a vis his opponent").
" See Rakoff supra note 2, at 16; INNOCENCE PROJECT, Report: Guilty Pleas on the Rise,
Criminal Trials on the Decline, Aug. 7, 2018, https://www.innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-onthe-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline/ ("Over the last 50 years, defendants chose trial in less than
three percent of state and federal criminal cases-compared to 30 years ago when 20 percent of
those arrested chose trial.").
7 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the highest standard
of
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, was required in criminal cases by due process and fundamental
fairness); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (holding that the trial court's failure to
give jury instruction on presumption of innocence violated fundamental fairness); Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978) (requiring, upon defense request, jury instruction on
presumption of innocence).
7 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding that conclusive presumptions
in jury instruction may not be used to shift burden of proof of an element of crime to defendant);
see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975) (holding that the defendant may not be
required to carry the burden of disproving an element of a crime for which he is charged); cf
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977) (holding that defendant, however, may be
required to bear burden of affirmative defense).
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the defendant related to his affirmative defense of alibi" and the defendant
is permitted to wear something other than his "prison clothes" at trial."
Based on this line of cases, if a practice or procedure in a criminal
case appears inherently unfair to the accused and is designed only to improve
for government efficiency at trial, then the accused may raise a constitutional
82
challenge under the doctrine of fundamental fairness and due process. In
addition to its attention to fundamental fairness, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated renewed attention to certain trial-related, constitutional
protections afforded to the accused under the Sixth Amendment, such as his
right to a jury trial before an impartial jury and his right to confront the
witnesses against him."
b. Enumeratedconstitutionalrights at the criminaltrial
For the last century, the Court has reinforced the defendant's
constitutional rights as they relate to the government's conduct during the
investigative stage of the case. Specifically, the Court has held that the
84
defendant has a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and free from the compulsion of involuntary, coerced confessions." Most
of the constitutional jurisprudence in criminal procedure cases have focused
on the relationship between government overreach and coercion during the
investigative stages of cases and the accused's rights to be free from such
intrusions. Yet, the Supreme Court remained relatively dormant as to the
constitutional protections to be afforded to the accused during the criminal
trial.16

so See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973) (holding that the defendant may not
be required to provide disclosure to the prosecution of an alibi defense unless defendant is given
reciprocal discovery rights against the state).
8 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976) (holding that, while convenient and
efficient, the government cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in
"identifiable prison clothes").
82 See cases cited supra notes 75, 78 and accompanying text; see also Langford, supra note
76, at 448.
83 See Meares, supra note 71, at 123 ("[T]he Bill of Rights has become the central mechanism
for the articulation of constitutional criminal procedure."); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 377
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment should be limited to the specific
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights).
84 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.").
8 See U.S. CONST. amend V. ("No person shall be ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.").
81 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1) (describing constitutional rights that must be knowingly and
voluntarily waived in open court with the judge during a guilty plea).
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Beginning in the early 2000s, the Supreme Court expanded its
constitutional review in criminal procedure cases to include two trial-related
protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights.8 7 First, the Court crafted a
modem application of the accused's Sixth Amendment "right to a trial before
an impartial jury" to address the lower court's treatment of evidence
supporting sentencing enhancements within mandatory sentencing schemes
in the federal and state justice systems." The Court next developed a new
constitutional test and markedly changed the application of the confrontation
clause to criminal cases.89
Trial courts now decide the admissibility of certain evidence
including out-of-court statements, taking into account constitutional
grounds, 90 as opposed to relying exclusively on evidentiary grounds.
Importantly, the court's constitutional analysis has caused dramatic changes
in the government's presentation during the modem criminal trial. The
prosecution has had to alter its approach to trial presentation as these

[T]he defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant
personally in open court [and] ... the court must inform the defendant of, and determine
that the defendant understands, the following:
(A) the government's right, in a prosecution for perjury or false statement, to use
against the defendant any statement that the defendant gives under oath;
(B) the right to plead not guilty ... to persist in that plea;
(C) the right to a jury trial;
(D) the right to be represented by counsel-and if necessary have the court appoint
counsel-at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding;
(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be
protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and
to compel the attendance of witnesses;
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a plea of
guilty. ...
Id.
87 See supra Section 111 (discussing Supreme Court's rejuvenation of enumerated
rights under
the Sixth Amendment including defendant's right to a fair trial, jury trial and to confront the
witnesses against him); see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 232-33 (2005); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
88 See infra notes 92-106.
89 See infra Section Il.b (discussing the ripple affect caused by Crawfordand its progeny);
see generally Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62.
9 See infra note 109 (describing Crawford's quickly evolving list refining the new
confrontation clause test and "testimonial" evidence requiring a live witness or past crossexamination).
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decisions fundamentally interfered with the "business as usual" approach to
criminal justice.9 1
i. Right to a jury trial before an impartial jury
Our adversarial system of criminal justice ensures that the defendant
"enjoy[s] the right to a ... trial before impartial jury" under the Sixth
Amendment.9 2 The Supreme Court, beginning in 2004, relied upon the
enumerated, constitutional right to a jury trial to dramatically alter the
landscape of criminal sentencing across the country in federal and state
cases.93 From approximately 1988 through 2004,94 the government narrowly
presented its trial evidence to prove only the elements of the charged conduct
to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.95 Prosecutors strategically omitted
any trial presentation of other "considerations" that they reserved instead for
determination by the judge alone at sentencing under a lesser burden of
proof.96 That is, the government would present only the evidence necessary
to prove the offense elements to the jury during the criminal trial by the
higher burden of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt.
The prosecution affirmatively deprived the jury of any trial
97
presentation to prove these other "sentencing considerations" that, at a later
hearing outside the presence of the jury, would serve to increase the accused
ultimate sentence. 9 Following the jury verdict and prior to sentencing, the
government merely furnished the trial judge with information, typically
documentary evidence, supporting these sentencing considerations. The trial

9' See cases cited infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions
which caused significant changes to the government's trial presentation of government expert
testimony and reports); infra note 111.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9 See generally Blakley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-02 (2004); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 236-37 (2005).
94 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987) (amended 1989). This is
known as the "mandatory guidelines era" because the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") were binding in federal courts. See id The "era" of the mandatory Guidelines is
defined as November 1, 1987, the date the Guidelines became "effective," to January 12, 2005, the
date of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005).
9 See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
96 See id. "Based upon Booker's criminal history and the quantity of drugs found by the jury,
the .. . Guidelines required . .. [between 210 and 262 months in prison]. The judge, however, held
a post-trial sentencing proceeding and concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker
had possessed an additional566 grams of crack and ... obstruct[ed] justice .... [Mandating a]
sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
9 See id (describing the additional weight of drugs and obstruction as "sentencing
considerations" merely found by the trial court by preponderance of the evidence).
9' See id
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court, at a judge-only sentencing hearing, made findings on applicable
sentencing enhancements using a far lesser burden of proof, preponderance
of the evidence. 99
In its 2004 decision in Blakely v. Washington,"oo the Supreme Court
rejected Washington state's streamlined, "business as usual" procedure that
allowed prosecutors to segregate from the jury certain factual determinations
that later served to enhance the accused's sentence imposed by the court.'0
Congress invested heavily, with time and money, in its own mandatory
sentencing scheme to promote uniformity and consistency through the
nation's federal courts.1 02 In the 1980s, Congress authorized the United
States Sentencing Commission and its standardization of federal sentencing
though the United States Sentencing Guidelines.' 0 3
One year after Blakely, in two companion cases - United States v.
Booker'04 and United States v. Fanfan,'sthe Court handed down a qualified
rejection of a practice orchestrated by federal prosecutors within the federal
system that was similar to the Washington state procedure in Blakely. The
Booker Court torpedoed Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and their
mandatory sentencing scheme as set forth in the Guidelines. Decades of
sentencing jurisprudence also was impacted to guarantee that the defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial applied to even the slightest factual
consideration not properly presented to the jury during the criminal trial.
Prosecutors had uniformly chosen their strategy of presenting
matters related to sentencing for determination by judges rather than juries
as a matter of efficiency, to streamline the path to conviction by jury verdict
" See id.
' 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
101 See id. at 312-14.
102 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2018); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) ("Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the
sentencing judge to determine" a convicted defendant's sentence, but a review of the legislative
history strongly suggests that the sentencing disparity that Congress hoped to eliminate did not

stem from prosecutorial discretion, but instead from unchecked judicial discretion in formulating
sentences); United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1400 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Three principal forces
propelled the legislation: Congress sought to establish truth in sentencing by eliminating parole, to
guarantee uniformity in sentencing for similarly situated defendants, and to ensure that the
punishment fit the crime.").
103 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 31, 38 1983 WL 25404. Senator Ted Kennedy argued that
sentencing guidelines were necessary because "[flederal criminal sentencing is a national disgrace.
See id Under current sentencing procedures, judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of
sentences to offenders convicted of similar crimes." 130 CONG. REc. 1644 (1984).
104 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
10 542 U.S. 956 (2004). The jury findings in Fanfan, regarding the conspiracy and the 500
grams of powder, translated to an applicable sentencing guideline range of 63 to 78 months,
whereas the judge at sentencing found additional drug weight, that equated to 188 to 235 months.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 228.
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(as well as the ultimate sentence sought).1 o 6 It is significant that, in these

cases, the government did provide the accused with a "jury trial before an
impartial jury" under the Sixth Amendment as a matter of guilt to the crime
charged."o7 But the defense eventually challenged this practice as depriving
the accused of a "jury trial" on other aspects of the government's
presentation. The Court relied upon the accused's constitutional right to a
jury trial to end a widespread "business as usual" practice and policy by
prosecutors in the state and federal systems."os
ii. Right to confront witnesses against the accused
At about the same time, in 2004, the Supreme Court again relied on
an enumerated right under the Sixth Amendment to establish an entirely new
testl 0 9 for the defendant's right to confront witnesses against him during the
criminal trial.1"o The Court, beginning with its 2004 decision in Crawford
v. Washington1 1 and its progeny 1 2 , revived the once dormant Confrontation
Clause. The Crawford Court created a new test for Confrontation Clause
cases and rejected a series of "business as usual" government practices and

106 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313) ("[T]he interest in fairness
and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial-a common-law right that defendants enjoyed
for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment-has always outweighed the
interest in concluding trials swiftly.").
107 See id at 227 (recounting that the jury found Booker guilty at trial of possession with intent
to distribute controlled substances).
10 See id. at 244-45 (rejecting the government practice of segregating matters related to the
elements for the jury ad matter for the judge at sentencing).

" See United States v. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (rejecting the "I know it when I see it" test
for confrontation clause violations under the Sixth Amendment); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 66 (1980) (overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36) (holding that an out-of-court statement was
admissible if it falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or otherwise demonstrated an
"indicia of reliability.").
110 See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 at 66-67 (holding that Confrontation Clause violations are
subject to harmless error analysis); see also United States v. Gillam, 167 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir.
1999).
"'

541 U.S. 36 (2004).

112 See generally Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (rejecting the
government's use of laboratory reports in lieu of government expert witness from the laboratory);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (rejecting the government's theory that
government expert witnesses from the laboratory were fungible); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50
(2012) (allowing the government's expert witness to read from the laboratory reports created by
other government experts). Following Crawford, the Court has had to revisit the rule for
"testimonial evidence" and interpret variations of out-of-court statements introduced in a criminal
case and against the accused, both statements made to the government and statements made by the
government.
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policies.' 13 The Court focused on a defendant's right to meaningfully cross
examine government witnesses who bear testimony against him." 4
The court's new test under Crawford centered on the term
"testimonial" and broadened the concept of "'witnesses' against the
accused" to include anyone who bears testimony against the defendant."'
The new test in Crawford constitutionally excluded at trial any pretrial
statements made to the government that the declarant "would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially."" 6 Further, the Court's guidance did not
exempt those statements made by the government that it would also expect
to be part of its case presentation during the criminal trial."' Many of the
out-of-court statements that the government planned to be part of its case
presentation because the statements were previously deemed admissible
under the rules of evidence, were instead found to constitutionally require to
be subjected to some form of cross-examination during the criminal trial or
when the statement was made prior to trial. Statements by the government,
for these purposes, included statements by government experts, the use of
their reports, and their prospective testimony in criminal cases."'
Before Crawford, prosecutors relied almost exclusively on the rules
of evidence to elicit convenient testimony from government experts at trial
and admit certified laboratory reports."' In some jurisdictions, the
government established practices and policies that allowed for the fungibility
of its government laboratory experts, those professionals who tested
controlled substances or conducted scientific or technical testing. Trial
courts in Massachusetts even allowed prosecutors to present scientific,
laboratory evidence through a certified document only and thus without a
sponsoring witness. 120
113 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (rejecting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) and
creating a new test for whether an out-of-court statement offered by the government and against
the accused violated the accused's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him).
Justice Roberts' failings were on full display in the proceedings below. See id at 65. Sylvia
Crawford made her statement while in police custody, herself a potential suspect in the case. Id.
114 See id at 50-51.
1s See id. at 51-52, 67-69.
116 The Court described that evidence was "testimonial" when the declarant could reasonably
expect that it "would be used prosecutorially." Id. at 51.
117 See generally cases cited supra note
112.
"1 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (finding that the statement at issue from the defendant's wife
was admissible via the "statement against penal interest" hearsay exception under Washington Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(3)); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321-24 (finding
that the government's laboratory report was admissible as a business record of the laboratory under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)).
"' See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321-24.
120 See id at 328-29. After Crawford, the court had the opportunity to look at Massachusetts
practice with respect to lab testing and lab reports during the criminal trial. See id. Under the
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The Crawford Court caused lower courts to re-examine the
admissibility of broad categories of out-of-court statements previously
12
admitted against the accused in criminal cases under the rules of evidence. 1
The Court's renewed focus on the defendant's constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him thereafter included his right to cross examine
out-of-court declarants who the government did not intend to be witnesses at
trial. The implications of the new test under the Confrontation Clause
fundamentally changed the way that the prosecution presented its case at trial
and caused trial courts to weigh constitutional considerations with the rules
of evidence to determine admissibility.
Prior to 2004, trial courts simply glossed over any meaningful
constitutional analysis and routinely admitted the testimony and reports from
government laboratory witnesses. The government's presentation of these
expert witnesses and their reports was certainly efficient and streamlined the
path to conviction by jury verdict. The Court's analysis, however, gave
weight to separate considerations under the Confrontation Clause and led to
different admissibility outcomes than did applying only the rules of
evidence. Reinvigorating Confrontation Clause analysis over the next
fifteen years, the Court held that the defendant's constitutional right during
his criminal trial trumped the government's interest in efficiency and
convenience.
iii. Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
The American criminal justice system favors one method over all
others for the accused to advance his theory of the defense before the jury:
trial courts prefer that he testify under oath. Trial courts regularly reference
the accused's ability and option to testify in his own defense when excluding
other evidence potentially favorable to him at trial, including portions of his
own pretrial statements. Trial courts also rely upon the accused's option to
testify in his own defense when he specifically raises constitutional
challenges.

Crawford test, the lab report was certainly testimonial and one that the government expected to use
prosecutorially. See id. The court rejected Massachusetts' long time, efficient trial practices and
required that a live witness be produced to give meaning to the criminal defendants Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him at trial. Id. The government in many
jurisdictions had processes and evidentiary pathways to admitting out-of-court statements without
regard for the defendant's constitutional rights before Crawford. For example, over the course of
decades, in Massachusetts state court the government routinely presented the lab reports in
narcotics cases without a witness from the lab.
121 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244-45.
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There is little to no legal support for the proposition that the accused
must forgo his privilege against self-incrimination during the criminal trial
to preserve his other, trial related constitutional protections. However, trial
courts tend to pit the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination against
the other protections discussed in this Article, such as his constitutional right
to present a theory of defense, his right to a fair trial, his right to a jury trial,
and his right to confront the witnesses against him.122 The accused, of
course, should not have to waive his privilege against self-incrimination and
subject himself to cross-examination in order to present at trial his side of
the story and to offer the jury a theory of the defense. Nevertheless, trial
courts essentially compel the criminal defendant to waive his privilege
against self-incrimination, so that he may meaningfully exercise other
constitutional rights afforded to him, when he needs those protections the
most-at trial.
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend for its protections
afforded to the accused at trial to work like a game show. Instead the
Framers would have wanted the accused, whose liberty is at risk, to enjoy all
of the constitutional protections afforded to him during his criminal trial.
The constitutional safeguards underlying the defendant's right to present his
"theory of the defense" and the notions of fundamental fairness work
together to benefit the accused during his criminal trial. The trial-related
protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights similarly were intended to work
in concert to protect all citizens when they may need those protections most,
during a criminal jury trial in which they are accused of a serious crime.
The Founding Fathers intended the accused's constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination to act as a shield for the accused to raise
both before and during trial.123 Under current judicial treatment the
defendant may have no choice but to forgo that privilege against selfincrimination, testify under oath at trial, and "subject himself to crossexamination by the government."1 2 4 The constitutional analysis of the
122 See supra Section I.c. With proper judicial treatment of his pretrial statements,
the
defendant would be better informed in making this decision as to whether to testify in his own
defense.
123 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (enumerating how defendant can invoke his privilege against selfincrimination before or during trial). The defendant maintains his privilege even if he waived it
pretrial and provided statements to law enforcement.
124 See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
a
defendant cannot attempt to introduce an exculpatory statement made at the time of his arrest
without "subjecting [himself] to cross-examination"); United States v. Fernandez, 839 F.2d 639,
640 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the
accused's ability to elicit his exculpatory hearsay statements on cross-examination); See Ortega,
203 F.3d at 683 (citing Fernandez, 839 F.2d at 640) (analyzing admissibility of hearsay offered by
the defense). The Ninth Circuit in Ortega went so far as to hold that the accused should not be
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consequences of excluding the non-inculpatory portions of the defendant's
pretrial statement called for in this Article should compel different results.
ARGUMENT
The criminally accused have long argued that the non-inculpatory
portions of their pretrial statements should be independently admissible at
trial. However, most defense arguments have been reduced to evidentiary
arguments that the applicable evidence code expressly intended to preclude
The absence of decisions undertaking a
defendants' desired uses.
provides a glimmer of hope for criminal
issue
this
of
constitutional analysis
defendants. And the timing is right for constitutional consideration of this
issue.
The criminal justice system is characterized by a diminishing
number of criminal trials. We have learned more about the relative reliability
of confessions and the growing body of research on false confessions. The
Supreme Court, as discussed in Sections II and III of this Article, has
resuscitated trial-related, constitutional protections and (hopefully) the
umbrella doctrine of "fundamental fairness" during the criminal trial. These
constitutional considerations should be a basis for challenging admissibility
determinations that lead to unjust policies and practices-and results-at
trial. This appears to be true in part because the perceived risks of allowing
the defendant to make use of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements can be
regulated with limitations and a balancing test for determining admissibility.
In the argument sections that follow, this Article will discuss three
options for the defendant to make use of the non-inculpatory portions of his
pretrial statement during his criminaltrial.
(1) The defendant could independently offer into evidence the noninculpatory portions of his pretrial statement (Section IV).
(2) When the government admits only portions of the defendant's
pretrial statement as his confession at trial, the defendant could
ask the court to admit the other portions of his pretrial statement
contemporaneously in the government's case-in-chief (Section
V).
(3) The defendant could frame cross-examination questions of
government witnesses that reflect those same portions of his
pretrial statements. (Section VI).

allowed to use the Confrontation Clause as a means of admitting hearsay testimony through the
"back door" without subjecting himself to cross-examination. See Ortega, 203 F.3d at 683 (citing
Fernandez, 839 F.2d at 640).
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IV. DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT
ADMISSION OF HIS NON-INCULPATORY STATEMENTS AT TRIAL
The first of the proposed options would require that trial courts allow
a defendant to independently admit portions of his pretrial statement during
the defense case-in-chief consistent with his theory of the defense. This is
the least probable of the three proposed options, but, because of the order of
proof in a criminal trial, it is the fairest of the three. The defendant currently
has no ability to have the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement
independently admitted; instead, those portions would be categorically
excluded under the rules of evidence.
Under the first proposed approach, the lower court's admissibility
determination would account for constitutional considerations as well as
evidentiary doctrines. This process must be analyzed with a constitutional
lens that includes the theory of the defense, the umbrella doctrine of
fundamental fairness, and other trial-related constitutional rights. Subject to
the limitations and a balancing test set out in Section VII below, trial courts
would allow both sides to present the relevant portions of the accused's
pretrial statement that advance their respective theories of the case.
a. Constitutionalright to advance a "theory of the defense"
The accused enjoys a constitutional right to advance his theory of
the defense before the jury, so long as it is properly supported by evidence.
His ability to independently admit portions of his pretrial statement turns on
how the favorable parts of his pretrial statement relate to, and align with, his
theory of the defense. An accused's theory of the defense that is based upon
a critique of the government's investigation lends itself to such a connection.
The accused's theory of the defense could converge on a
combination of theories such as mistaken identity, failure of proof, or the
quality of the investigation. For example, if the defendant offered additional
investigative leads and suspects in his pretrial statements to law enforcement
that were not pursued by law enforcement, then those portions of his
statement may support his theory of the defense. The trial court's denial of
this evidence supporting his theory of the defense connects directly to the
due process right of fundamental fairness during the criminal trial and his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on all material issues at trial.
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b. Fundamentalfairness during the criminaltrial
The inherent connection between a defendant's right to present his
theory of the defense at trial, and the notions of fundamental fairness in the
criminal trial is instructive here. The interplay between an accused's theory
of the defense and fundamental fairness comes to bear with the defendant's
right to independently admit the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial
statement. The accused must be able to support his theory of the defense,
particularly if his theory represents a critique of the government's
investigation, with portions of his own pretrial statement.
There is not an issue with a defense theory critical of the government
investigation. Because, once the defendant testifies in his own defense under
oath, then our criminal justice system readily allows those theories of the
defense based on critique of the government's investigation. Our criminal
justice system should go further, however, to conclude that it offends the
notions of fundamental fairness to not permit the criminal defendant to
advance his defense theory in other ways, including a way that permits the
defendant to preserve his privilege against self-incrimination. Notions of
fundamental fairness must compel lower courts to allow the accused to
preserve all his constitutional rights during the criminal trial, as opposed to
requiring the accused to waive one constitutional protection to advance
another.
The defendant's inability to make any use of his non-inculpatory
pretrial statements under the rules of evidence rises to the level 25 of a
"procedure or policy" that offends the notions of fundamental fairness
during the criminal trial.12 6 The process due to the accused during his
criminal trial requires that the notions of fundamental fairness be met during
all phases of that trial.
For decades, the government's presentation of the defendant's
"confession" has been exclusively governed by the rules of evidence and in
favor of an efficient and streamlined government presentation during the
criminal trial. Drafters of evidence codes, federal and state, 127 certainly

125 See supra notes 72-78.
126 See supra note 78; cf Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory ofAmerican Adversary Criminal
Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 126 (1987-88) (discussing how the defendant's
constitutional rights at trial can actually hinder effective truth-finding). Plainly, the criminal
defendant has a set of rights which may interfere with truth-finding and which go beyond immediate
fairness considerations. A defendant's right against self-incrimination, the right to unilateral
discovery from the prosecution, the right to ajury trial, and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, for example, are potentially significant barriers to truth-finding. Id.
127 The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by order of the Supreme Court on Nov. 20,
1972, transmitted to Congress by the Chief Justice on February 5, 1973, and became effective on
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constructed the rules of evidence to disfavor the accused's use of his pretrial
statements. Yet, constitutional, as well as evidentiary considerations, should
factor into the trial court's admissibility determinations in the criminal case.
As it happened with the Court's holdings as to trial-related,
constitutional rights in the early 2000's,128 trial courts should revisit this
procedure and policy that unfairly dices the defendant's pretrial statement.
To exclude this information under only the rules of evidence, predominantly
rules relating to hearsay, trial courts play a role in orchestrating an unfair
proceeding. The prospect of a recurring constitutional violation that offends
fundamental fairness during the criminal trial should outweigh
considerations of efficiency.
c. Sixth Amendment right to trial before an unbiasedjury
In addition to the notions of fundamental fairness grounded in due
process, the accused is entitled to his Sixth Amendment right to a "trial
before an unbiased jury."129 The Supreme Court instructed that, even if a
case is presented to ajury, that case can still suffer from a Sixth Amendment,
jury trial violation. If an issue is material to the outcome of the jury's
determination of guilt (or at sentencing),' 3 0 then the defendant is also
constitutionally afforded a jury trial on that narrow issue. Under the same
argument, the accused is entitled to a jury trial on the narrow issue discussed
in this Article, the government's unfair apportioning of his pretrial statement.
The accused's pretrial statements to law enforcement are not always
the neat and clean confessions that prosecutors are permitted to present at
trial.131 Instead, a defendant's pre-trial statement may equivocate, minimize
his culpability, and raise questions about the government's investigation.
Yet, the government's redacted confession presentation can be deceptively
clean, streamlined and favorable to the state.

July 1, 1973. The federal rules derived from state evidence codes including the California Evidence

Code.
128 See infra Section III.b. (describing the Supreme Court's renewed focus on the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses against him).
129 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra Section UI.a (describing the purpose of the Due
Process Clause as promoting fundamental fairness).
130 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-89 (1963) (setting forth "materiality" as the
standard for the government's constitutional discovery obligations); see also United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-10 (1976). The theory underlying the government's constitutional
discovery requirement is, the guilty are convicted and the innocent are acquitted. The government
must ensure that trials are fair so that the innocent will not be convicted.
131 See supra Section I.b (outlining an illustrative example of the Ponzi scheming promoter as
the criminal defendant).
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The Supreme Court, in Booker and its progeny, provides guidance
that there is constitutional infirmity when the prosecutor picks and chooses
potentially outcome-determinative information that will not be before the
jury and therefore will not be proved beyond reasonable doubt at trial. The
Booker Court held that the government violated the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial when it omitted from trial information not
needed to prove the elements of the offense. The Court held that the
defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial outweighed the government's
interest in an efficient and streamlined presentation at trial. Similar
compelling interests are at stake here. The jury deserves to hear and pass on
the omitted information here: the defendant's non-inculpatory, pretrial
statements.
The defendant is entitled to more than a simplified and stream-lined
jury trial. He is constitutionally entitled to more than a mere day in court.
It's not just about the accused having his day in court. Trial courts must
ensure the quality of all aspects of his day in court. We must review the
matters that the government presented to the jury and, more critically, the
13 2
matters that the prosecution strategically left out.
When part of the evidence that the jury will use to judge guilt at trial
includes the accused's confession, then, as a constitutional matter, the
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on that narrow, yet material, issue. The
jury should hear all relevant portions 3 3 of the defendant's statement and
decide the case understanding the full context in which the incriminating
portions of the statement were made. Current judicial treatment permits the
government to have a jury trial only on those portions that reinforce the
government's theory of guilt. The defendant maintains a constitutional right
to a jury trial on all aspects of a single piece of evidence, a confession,
wherein even the slightest omissions could lead to a verdict that deprives him

of his liberty.
d. Better timing in the defense case-in-chief
Independently admitting portions of the accused's pretrial statement
is the most difficult outcome for a trial court to accept, but that outcome is
fairest. That is, it is preferable that the defendant first fully appreciates the
132 See supra notes 95-96. The prosecution in Booker strategized to present the bare minimum
before the jury at trial to save other matters for later judge-alone determinations under a lesser
burden of proof. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. This is not unlike when the government strategically
presents the accused's confession at trial without the context of the surrounding statements that do
not incriminate him, and may even exculpate him. See id.
133 See FED. R. EVID. 401. Under the proposal, relevance is still an important, threshold
limitation on the admissibility of evidence.
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government's case-in-chief against him and, armed with that information,
then decides whether to present witnesses and evidence, testify in his own
defense or present independently admissible portions of his pretrial
statement.
e. The reliabilityof the defendant's statement
The Innocence Project and other organizations have unveiled some
of the root causes that led to wrongful convictions. Many cases where
convicted defendants were later exonerated involved "confession" evidence
presented by the government turned out to be false. This has happened
frequently enough that the field of false confessions is ripe for expert
testimony in criminal trials.
Trial courts, knowing this, readily admit the inculpatory portions of
the defendant statements to law enforcement pretrial. The reliability and
validity of the defendant's incriminating statements appears to present less
of an issue in our criminal justice system. Reliability and whether the
statement is "self-serving" becomes a concern when the defendant seeks to
admit or make use of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements at trial.

f

The Ponzi scheme promoter example

Drawing upon the Ponzi scheme example above, if the Ponzi
promoter's theory of the defense related to investigatory leads not taken,
suspects not pursued and the government's "tunnel vision" in narrowing its
focus prematurely to him as the bad actor, then he has an argument to
independently admit the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement,
in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 9. Following the close of the government's case
and during his case-in chief, the accused could independently admit these
parts of his pretrial statement as evidence in support of his stated theory of
the defense. The defendant could then request a specially-crafted jury
instruction and better argue his theory of the defense to the jury in
summation. Perhaps most importantly, the accused could do so while
maintaining his privilege against self-incrimination.
V. DEFENDANT'S NON-INCULPATORY STATEMENTS
CONTEMPORANEOUSLY ADMITTED DURING THE
GOVERNMENT'S PRESENTATION
This Article's second proposal is, when the government presents the
defendant's confession during its case-in chief, the defendant is
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constitutionally entitled to contemporaneously admit all or some of the other
portions of his statement. When the government offers something less than
the entirety of the defendant's pretrial statement during its presentation, this
Article argues that the defendant enjoys a constitutional right, or a commonlaw, evidentiary option, to present the other relevant portions of his own
pretrial statement at the same time. At the very least, in fairness, the jury
should consider the redacted portions of the defendant's confession to
complete the context of the defendant's statement.
a. Fundamentalfairness
The fundamental fairness argument in the first proposal above
applies equally here. When the government presents only incriminating
portions of the defendant's pretrial statement during its trial presentation, the
defendant can point to a phase of his criminal trial that is patently unfair.
The current treatment of his pretrial statement, and how the government can
parse out a confession, offends notions of fundamental fairness and due
process for the accused.
Examples of procedures and policies that the Court found violated
fundamental fairness are similarly instructive here. By precluding the
accused from using the non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statement at
trial to put into proper context the portions of his pretrial statement that were
admitted into evidence by the government, the criminal defendant is forced
either to accept that misleading presentation by the prosecution or to waive
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to support his own
theory of the defense of trial. This current treatment of the defendant's
pretrial statement is as offensive and damning to notions of fundamental
fairness as forcing him to wear his prison clothes at trial or to carry the
burden to proof on one of the government's elements of trial.
The doctrine of fundamental fairness further should be triggered
when the parties to a civil trial are treated more fairly than the criminal
defendant within the adversarial jury trial system. How can lower courts
decide that the defendant receives a fair trial, receives the process that is due
to him, when the court permits the government to pick and choose the
defendant's words that will incriminate him during the trial? It is time to reexamine this practice with a meaningful, constitutional analysis.
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b. Common law evidentiary doctrine
When the trial court allows the government to present his confession
at trial,1 34 the criminal defendant has until now relied on a collection of
evidentiary rules to request that the court contemporaneously admit omitted,
non-inculpatory portions of his statement. The defendant specifically relies
upon rules of evidence based on fairness within the adversarial trial system
such as Federal Rules of Evidence 102,'" 106,136 611(a)1 37 and 403.138 The
drafters of evidence codes, however, sought to exclude potentially selfserving, pretrial statements made by the defendant and this concern typically
trumps the application of these other rules.
Tantamount to a categorical exclusion, courts remain extremely
hesitant to recognize any bone fide use of a defendant's pretrial statement
other than by the prosecution as a confession. The trial court also has failed
to exercise its discretion to admit evidence because otherwise it would
unfairly prejudice the accused or potentially mislead to the jury. The trial
courts simply do not favor the accused's admission or use of his pretrial
statements. Trial courts typically reject these purely evidentiary arguments
because, in part, the rules have strayed from the common law doctrine and
lost the connection to the underlying premise of "fairness" and "ascertaining
the truth" for the parties at trial. 3 9
i. The common law "rule of completeness"
The common law, evidentiary doctrine of the "rule of completeness"
furnishes an excellent argument for the defendant in addressing the
admissibility of clarifying or qualifying portions of his non-inculpatory,
134 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
135 See FED. R. EVI. 102 ("These rules should be construed so as to administer every
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of
evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.").
136 See FED. R. EVID. 106 ("Ifa party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement,
an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other writing
or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." (emphasis
added)).
137 See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) ("The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures
effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment." (emphasis added)).
138 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.").
1" See FED. R. EVID. 102, 106 & 611(a).
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pretrial statements. 140 The rule permits a party to contemporaneously admit
the other portions of a recording, writing or oral statement that were left out
of the opponent's trial presentation. 14 1 The rule of completeness, partiallycodified under Rule 106,142 sets out a clear method for the criminal defendant
to contemporaneously admit the omitted, non-inculpatory portions of his
pretrial statement. 143 The rule operates less as an evidentiary principal and
more as a fairness and timing mechanism. While application of Rule106
should itself provide the relief sought in the second proposal, unfortunately,
the trial courts seldom agree.
Courts rely upon one of three explanations in rejecting the
application of Rule 106 to support denying the defendant's request to admit
the favorable portions of his pretrial statement. First, courts hold that Rule
106 only applies to writings and recordings and, therefore, doesn't apply to
oral pretrial statements by the accused.'" Second, courts hold that the rule
does not render inadmissible information admissible because it is coupled in
the same writing or recording as the information offered by the proponent.
Lastly, as discussed above, the defendant can waive his privilege against
self-incrimination and testify under oath to offer the non-inculpatory
portions of his pretrial statement. 145
Such judicial reasoning can be countered as follows. First, the "rule
of completeness" applies equally under Rule 611(a) for oral statements, as
Rule 106 applies to "writings and recordings."' 46 Also, many pretrial
140 See FED. R. EVID. 106; see also Ortega, 203 F.3d at 682 (holding that Rule 106 "does not
compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence"). Rule 106 applies only to written
and recorded statements. FED. R. EVID. 106; see also Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95,
103 (2d Cir. 1995). If the government witness' testimony concerned an unrecorded oral confession,
the rule of completeness does not apply. Even if the rule of completeness did apply, exclusion of
the defendant's exculpatory statements was proper because these statements would still have
constituted inadmissible hearsay. See Ortega, 203 F.3d at 682; see also Collicott, 92 F.3d at 983.
141 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM supra note 16.
142 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1988).
143 See United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
Rule 106 requires that the evidence the proponent seeks to admit must be relevant to the issues in
the case. Even then, a trial judge need admit only that evidence which qualifies or explains the
evidence offered by the opponent. In addition to relevance, the trial court should ask (1) does it
explain the admitted evidence, (2) does it place the admitted evidence in context, (3) will admitting
it avoid misleading the trier of fact, and (4) will admitting it insure a fair and impartial
understanding of all the evidence. Id; see also 21A Wright & Graham, Jr., § 5072.
'44 See FED. R. EVID. 106 (expressly incorporating "writings and recordings" and omitting oral
conversations).
145 See supra Section I.c.
146 See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) ("The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective
for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment."); see also United States v. Pacquette, 557 Fed. Appx. 933, 936 (11th Cir.
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statements are, in fact, written or recorded, including oral statements
recounted in an investigatory report or other writing.
Second, the common-law rule of completeness allows the opponent
to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence to give proper context to the
incomplete writing, recording or statement offered by the proponent. 147 in a
circuit split, 148 the majority of the trial courts hold that, although the
defendant's pretrial statement is inadmissible hearsay when offered by
him, 149 it should be contemporaneously admitted at the accused's request
under Rule 106 when the government offers only the incriminating parts of
his pretrial statement at trial. It is more logical, for a rule based on fairness
and timing, that a party should be able to consider inadmissible evidence at
the same time as the admissible evidence for context and to avoid
"misleading the jury."150

Courts must revisit the evidentiary dead ends for the accused on this
issue as well. Wholly distinct from the constitutional arguments in this
Article, the rules of evidence are purportedly premised on fairness to the
parties in our adversarial system of jury trial. But, as it relates to the
defendant's pretrial statements, the drafters of the rules and the trial courts
have favored government advantage at every turn.

2015) (extending the fairness standard in Rule 106 to oral statements "in light of Rule 611 (a)'s
requirements that the district court exercise reasonable control over witness interrogation and the
presentation of evidence to make them effective vehicles for the ascertainment of truth") (quoting
United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d
565, 579 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that the district court "retained substantial discretion under FED.
R. EVID. 611(a) to apply the rule of completeness to oral statements"); United States v. Branch, 91
F.3d 699, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting, without disagreement, that "[o]ther circuits have held
that Rule 611(a) imposes an obligation for conversations similar to what rule 106 does for
writings"); cf United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650 (holding that Rule 106 applies to
writings, but Rule 611(a) "renders it substantially applicable to oral testimony as well").
147 See 2 Michael H. Graham, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 106:2 (7th
ed. 2012). To
the extent however that such evidence, otherwise inadmissible, tends to deny, explain, modify,
qualify, counteract, repel, disprove or shed light on the evidence offered by the opponent, the
evidence may be admitted provided its explanatory value is not substantially outweighed by the
dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or waste of time, Rule
403. See id.
148 See id.
149 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (defining "not hearsay" as a statement by a
party offered
by the party opponent).
150 See 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL § 106.02[3]
(11th ed. 2015). "It seems that hearsay objections should not block use of a related statement [under
Rule 106] ... when it is needed to provide context for statements already admitted. Thus a
statement should be admissible if it is needed to provide context under Rule 106 and to prevent
misleading use of related statements even if the statement would otherwise be excludable hearsay."
Id.

40

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIV

VI. USING PORTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT'S NON INCULPATORY
STATEMENTS ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT
WITNESSES
The third and final proposal would allow the criminal defendant to
advance his theory of the defense by conducting a meaningful crossexamination of government witnesses at trial may require that he be able to
use his non-inculpatory statements in formulating questions. The best
vehicle for the defendant to advance his theory of the defense, in many
criminal cases, rests with cross-examination of government witnesses.
Again, when the defendant's theory relates to deficiencies in the
government's investigation, then the non-inculpatory portions of pretrial
statement can align directly with a proper"' and effective line of questioning
during cross-examination.
Even though the defendant enjoys the constitutional right to argue
as his sole defense that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof-and
thus not present any evidence nor testify in his own defense-unfortunately,
trial courts foreclose viable avenues of the defendant's cross-examination of
government witnesses that would support the defendant's burden-of-proof
Similar to those decisions denying the other uses for the
defense.
defendant's pretrial statements discussed above, trial courts rule against the
defendant's use of his non-inculpatory, pretrial statements for crossexamination purposes.' 52 This too offends notions of fundamental fairness
and due process in the criminal trial.'

'51 The standard for an acceptable question on cross-examination is whether the questioner has
a "good faith basis" to ask the question. Here, the accused relies upon his pretrial statement as the
"good faith basis" to question government witnesses in accordance with his theory of the defense.
152 Cf Mark A. Summers, Taking Confrontation Seriously: Does Crawford Mean That
Confessions Must Be Cross-Examined? 76 ALBANY L. REv. 1805, 1810 (2013). "Yet, reading a
defendant's confession to the police out of Crawford's definition of 'testimonial' statements is
problematic for several reasons. First, as the analysis above suggests, such an interpretation is
contrary to the plain language of Crawford. Second, on its face, it leads to an unavoidable
contradiction-an accusatory statement made by a third party to the police is 'testimonial,' while a
self-accusatory statement made by a defendant under exactly the same circumstances is not. And,
finally, it would put Crawford's understanding of the word 'witness' as used in the Confrontation
Clause at odds with the Court's interpretation of the same word in the Fifth Amendment." Id.
153 These admissibility determinations during the criminal trial offend notions of fundamental
fairness under the Due Process Clause and deprive the accused of his right to a trial before an
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment. See supra Section lI.a. Unlike the due process
umbrella protection of fundamental fairness and the defendant's right to a trial before an impartial
jury, discussed above, his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him provides
only the narrowest relief The Supreme Court's renewed interest in the Confrontation Clause with
a new test under Crawford focuses on the out-of-court declarant and the defendant's right to
meaningfully confront that person at trial. Like the examples that followed the Crawforddecision,
set out above, with respect to lab reports government expert witnesses who work in laboratories,
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Anytime the trial court limits the scope of cross-examination in a
criminal case, the accused has a viable Confrontation Clause argument under
the Sixth Amendment. It is more egregious here, as trial courts effectively
have barred viable defense cross-examination because the basis of the
questioning touched upon the accused's non-inculpatory, pretrial statements.
Merely because a line of cross-examination questioning referred to the
defendant's pretrial statement, lower courts have shut down the examination
and specifically excluded any reference by the accused to his own pretrial
statements. 15 4
a. No constitutionalright to confront yourself
A few trial courts have considered a defendant's Confrontation
Clause challenge to excluding his use of his pretrial statement during crossexamination. They quickly dispose of the issue without significant
constitutional analysis because they focus on the fact that the defendant is
the out-of-court declarant and conclude that the defendant has no
constitutional right to confront himself. Accordingly, this thin analysis
under the Confrontation Clause reveals the same result as the rules of
evidence.
The Confrontation Clause argument in this Article emphasizes a
slightly different constitutional right: the defendant's right to confront law
enforcement witnesses, not himself. Law enforcement witnesses aggregate
the tapestry of the government's case that involves other witnesses and
evidence against the accused. For the criminal defendant, no classification
of witnesses is more at odds with his theory of the defense and his hope for
a not guilty verdict at trial then law enforcement. The Confrontation Clause
should provide a meaningful opportunity for the accused to confront the law

the court ultimately held that the defendant had the constitutional right to conduct a specific type
of cross-examination with a specific witness compelled to attend trial.
154 See Fernandez, 839 F.2d at 640 (foreclosing cross-examination that referenced the
defendant's pretrial statement); Willis, 759 F.2d at 1501. Some scholars believe that the accused
has more than enough of an advantage when it comes to confronting the witnesses against him.
Summers, Taking Confrontation Seriously, at 1815.
He [the in-court witness] is confronting the very person whose statements he is reporting,
he is subject to cross- examination by counsel who has at his elbow the person who
knows all the facts and circumstances of the alleged statements and who is therefore in
the best possible position to conduct a searching inquiry, and, finally, the declarant may
himself go upon the stand and deny, qualify or explain the alleged admissions.
Id. (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the HearsayRule, 30 YALE L.J.
355, 355-59 (1921)) (noting Morgan's argument that extra-judicial party admissions were not
admitted for their truth).
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enforcement witness and, in so doing, the government's evidence lodged
against him at trial."'
b. Oddly honoringthe rules of evidence
Trial courts do not generally limit the defendant's cross-examination
of government witnesses for historically-accepted, trial presentation reasons.
However, lower courts do oddly honor the rules of evidence as they relate to
The
precluding any use by defendant of his pretrial statements.
constitutional violation of denying the accused's use of certain noninculpatory statements during the cross-examination of law enforcement
witnesses is exacerbated when the government is committed to introduce
inculpatory statements from the defendant at trial.
c. Defendant'sattempt to "subvert the rules" with "self-serving"
statements
Some courts reveal a perverse sense that somehow the defendant
would gain an unfair advantage during the criminal trial if he could use the
non-inculpatory portions of his pretrial statements at trial. Courts actually
refer to the defendant's attempts to subvert the rules of evidence by trying to
use his pretrial statements to formulate questions on cross-examination.
Non-inculpatory, pretrial statements by the accused are seen as only being
self-serving but statements that are potentially misleading to the jury.
Courts have held that to allow the defendant to independently
present his own pretrial statements would be "self-serving." However,
anytime one party to a litigation admits evidence or elicits testimony, that
party does so because that evidence is self-serving, because it favors their
side. In contrast, if the defendant's first words during the investigatory stage
of his own criminal conduct can support his theory of the defense at trial,
then it may be that those early statements may be more persuasive and
probative.

155 It stands to reason that many iterations of the defendants "theory of the defense" run in
direct contradiction to the government's presentation in its case in chief. The height of that
contradiction and necessary adversarial opposition during the criminal trial is the defense crossexamination of enforcement witnesses. While the court always can control the manner and mode
and duration of cross-examination, few of those determinations have actual constitutional
implications. Limiting and shutting down information for use when the defendant cross-examines
law enforcement may be one of those instances.
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d. Preservingthe privilege againstself-incrimination
Trial courts decide whether the defendant's ability, or in this case
inability, to cross-examine government witnesses particularly law
enforcement witnesses well before any criminal defendant should have to
make the determination to waive or preserve his right not to testify at trial.
A criminal defendant when considering whether or not he may take the stand
in his own defense should do so in light of all the evidence that was presented
to the jury at the time when the government closes its case. The sequence
and timing of the criminal trial again supports not pitting the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights against his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
If the defendant is allowed to conduct a meaningful crossexamination of law enforcement witnesses using some portions of his
pretrial statements consistent with his theory of the case, then he may not
need to testify in his own defense at trial and he can instead rest on a defense
that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof. If the defendant
is allowed to point out some of the deficiencies in the investigation and
investigatory steps not taken and suspects not pursued, then the defendant
may make a more informed decision about whether he needs to testify in his
own defense once the case proceeds to the defense case in chief
VII. LIMITATIONS AND A PROPOSED BALANCING TEST
The proposals in this Article come with some distinct limitations and
a proposed balancing to guard against the defendant's improper uses of his
pretrial statements and any gamesmanship by the defense.
a. Limitations to the proposals
The limitations on the criminal defendant's ability to use the noninculpatory portions of his pretrial statements should be as follows.
First, to borrow a legal term of art from advocacy, the defendant
must have a "good faith basis" for taking advantage of the proposals set forth
in this Article. Specifically applicable here, the defense must have a "good
faith basis" to pose a question to a government witness on cross-examination.
The relief sought here is distinct from hypothetical questions.
Second, this Article does not change the current law as to the
"exculpatory no" doctrine and it should not be included as part of the relief
sought here. That is, the criminal defendant is entitled to deny the allegations
against him upon his first interaction with government investigators without
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repercussions. The jury in a criminal case is instructed that the defendant
has plead not guilty and maintains his innocence at trial; thus, the accused's
"exculpatory no" need not be included in the proposed uses of his noninculpatory statements argued herein.
Third, if portions of the defendant's pretrial statement lack
reliability, then the trial court should not admit those portions and allow them
to infect the criminal trial. The government could refute the defendant's
theory of the defense that flows naturally from his non-inculpatory pretrial
statements. The government could investigate leads and other suspects and,
if necessary, request an evidentiary hearing prior to trial.
Lastly, the proposals apply only to pretrial statements provided
before the defendant meets with an attorney or without the benefit advice of
counsel. The proposals urge a new wave of trial court admissibility
determinations, not a criminal litigation strategy for defense attorneys and
savvy defendants in future criminal cases.
b. A proposed balancingtest
This Article urges trial courts to consider the defendant's
constitutional protections, as well as evidentiary doctrine, in determining the
admissibility and other uses for the defendant's non-inculpatory, pretrial
statements. In so doing, the lower court should weigh the competing
considerations for the government and the criminal defendant. The
government, as discussed above, has an interest in efficiency and a
streamlined trial presentation, but this interest must be weighed against
preserving the defendant's constitutional protections.
The government should be compelled to file a motion in limine to
exclude any portion of the defendant's pretrial statement. There is now a
presumption of inadmissibility, for the reasons discussed in this Article, for
any portion of the defendant's pretrial statement not presented by the
government as the accused's confession. The court would more readily
engage in the balancing test proposed in this section if the government were
required to affirmatively exclude the accused's non-inculpatory pretrial,
statements.
Assuming that the trial court conducts a balancing test, some factors
will favor admissibility and other factors will favor exclusion. The
limitations outlined above certainly will favor exclusion, as well as other
indicia of gamesmanship, unreliability and misleading or confusing the jury.
That is, the dangers set out in Rule 403 will continue to factor into any
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admissibility balancing test. 15 6 This Article offers three proposals designed
to activate the defendant's constitutional rights at trial, not open the door to
graymail tactics and gamesmanship.
In addition to the constitutional and evidentiary arguments above,
there are also some factual consideration that should be considered in
determining admissibility, such as whether: law enforcement officers failed
to pursue the investigatory leads or other suspects referred to in the
defendant's pretrial statement; the defendant was in a custody during the
interrogation and waived his Miranda rights including his privilege against
self-incrimination; the information within the non-inculpatory portions of
the defendants pretrial statement is corroborated by other witnesses or
evidence; the government introduces defendant's confession at trial,
consistent with the second proposal to contemporaneously admit the
defendant's non-inculpatory, pretrial statements.

156

See FED. R. EvID. 403.

